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organization's restriction, avoiding spams, etc. In this paper, we propose cryptographic schemes that can 
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enhancement for Internet storage, since the Internet server will not learn any information directed to its 
users, other than performing its task to deliver or stop the messages. Firstly, we describe a notion of non-
interactive publicly verifiable 1-out-of-n encryption by proposing a model together with its security 
requirements. Then, we extend this notion to a publicly verifiable ring-to-1-out-of-n encryption, that 
provides sender anonymity. We note that the previously known interactive versions of the publicly 
verifiable 1-out-of-n encryption cannot be used to construct publicly verifiable ring-to-1-out-of-n 
encryption. 
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Abstract
One of the important uses Internet is its ability to
connect people through the of or internet stor-
age. However; it is desirable to limit the use
or Internet storage due to restriction,
ing etc. In this we propose cryptographic
schemes that be used to stop to be
stored in the Internet We refer this technique 
vacy enhancement for Internet storage, since the Internet 
will not learn any directed to its users.
other its task to deliver or stop the mes-
sages. Firstly, we describe notion of pub-
licly verifiable encryption by proposing a
together with its Then, we extend this
notion to publicly verifiable ring-to- -out-of-n encryp-
tion, that provides sender anonymity. We note that the pre-
viously known interactive versions publicly
encryption cannot be used to construct publicly 
ring-to- I-out-of-n
Internet storage. publicly
encryption, publicly ring-to-I -
out-of n encryption. of knowledge
1. Introduction
The public Internet can be considered as a world
wide computer network, that is, a network that inter-
connects millions of computing devices throughout 
the world. Most of these devices are traditional desk-
top based workstations,
tops, tablet handheld devices and so forth. Among 
them, there are servers that store and transinit informa-
tion such as web pages and messages One of the
most important uses of Internet is its ability to connect peo-
ple through the use of or Internet storage. However.
it is often desirable to the use or Internet stor-
age due to restriction. avoiding spams,
etc
Consider a situation where there is an Internet storage
that can be used to store messages directed a group of
users, this situation. it would be desirable to install a
secure gateway to stop all messages that are not directed 
to its group members in will act as a mediator
a sender and a receiver of message in group Al-
ice to send a public-key encrypted message to Bob,
who is member of then must be able to check that 
the message is directed to a group member in and store 
the message in the Internet storage. However, the problem 
does not hold Bob’s key This problem has
considered to create an anonymous ad group In
this scenario. by knowing only the public of the
group members in must deterniine if the encrypted in-
coming data is for a group member in without being able 
to identify the actual recipient Moreover. the other mem-
ber in 1’,together with itself, must not be able to read the
message to Bob. In (or subsequently revised in
this problem been considered as publicly
able -out-of-n encryption scheme. and they pro-
posed an interactive protocol for in
In a different Alice does not want her identity
to be revealed Instead. she would like to send a message
to Bob on behalf of a group, which can be Sup-
pose Alice is a worker in insurance company who would
like to send a message to Bob. then the message is con-
sidered to belong to the company instead of sent by
Alice The situation becomes more complex than the origi-
nal scenario mentioned earlier. since cannot an
interactive protocol with Alice, and hence, the notion of
PVlnE essential and required We note
that this scenario is essential, especially rf we would like to
protect Alice’s Without having to assume that an
routing (eg MIX-nets) exists. then the existence 
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of is essential
a non-interactive a Prover (or Sender.re-
spectively) wishes to send a public-key encrypted message 
a Receiver through a Verifier The Prover
a group that consists of the Receiver
together with other people that belong to the same group 
as the Receiver Then, the conducts a
public-key encryption for the group of receivers in such a
way that the public verifier can be sure that the message
be decrypted by one of the receivers the group. It is
that the Verifier cannot the message,
2) the Verifier cannot identify to whom the message is 
designated to, and 3) the ier does not need to
form an interactive piotocol with the Prover to check
validity of the message
Our Contribution
The schcme used in is based on the and-choose
hence, between sender 
and verifier are required. this paper, we firstly provide a
notion of a Non-Interactive Publicly Verifiable 1-out-of-n
Encryption and propose a non-interactive
schcme employing a cut-and-choose technique that
satisfies our model Then. we extend this notion to cre-
ate a Publicly Verifiable -out-of-n Encryption 
(PVRTE) Scheme We shall point out that the interac-
tive version of PVlnE be used to generate a
PVRTE schcme We also provide a construc-
tion of PVRTE schemes any PVlnE schemes.
provide a complete security proof for our schemes
1.1. Sotations
Throughout this paper. we will the following nota-
tions. The ring of integers modulo a number is denoted by
and the subgroup of integers relatively
to Let denote a operator that con-
catenates two bit strings inputs. The inputs will be con-
verted to its binary representation where its length is
by a security parameter 
2. Cryptographic Tools
In this section, we will review some cryptographic tools, 
together with new cryptographic primi-
tives, that will be used throughout this paper.
be a large prime and = 2q- be also a Let
be a finite cyclic group of pnme Let 9 , be
two of Let y be a generator of such that
computing discrete logarithms ot any group element (apart 
from the identity element) with respect to one of the gen-
erators is infeasible Let (0, denote a
strong collision-resistant hash function
2.1. Signatureof Knowledge Representation
The signature of knowledge was proposed i n
We will use the following definition of signature of
knowledge from 
Definition [3] (c. {0,
is knowledge the discrete 
to the base of
is
An = can be computed if
the value (secret key) = is by selecting a
random integer and computing = niod and
then and according to
and
= - y).
This is also known as a proof of the knowl-
edge
3.2. Ring Schemes
We adopt the notations proposed in to define ring sig-
nature schemes. We note that the ring signature schemes are 
referred to -out-of-n in
Definition 2 A signature
algorithms
1" A probabilistic thut takes
private key
public
A probabilistic takes
list L that public
the one corresponds to outputs
{True or A
rithrn message arid a
and either True or accept or
reject, respectively. I t is required to True +-
L ) with &inoverwhelming
A ring that allows a mixture of factorization and log
based public keys has been constructed in [
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3. A New Signature of Knowledge for Proving
Equality of Discrete Logarithm and Double
Discrete Logarithm
In this section, we extend the notion of signature of 
knowledge mentioned the previous section to signature
of knowledge for proving equality of and
discrete logarithm. 
A {O . de-
b?
: A
is
to the
discrete of
This signature of knowledge i s represented by
. . whcre be a
security parameter, satisfying equation 
=
with
=
otherwise= {
)Note that =
To compute the of knowledge, three condi-
tions must hold
of = is known.
The o f = known
holds
We that an upper hound on the length of
e signature of knowledge 
as follows
Firstly, compute the of
for = -
where be constant. Then, select a random r
and compute as
with randomly chosen r , {0,
c
Finally, we set the following values 
I , 0
I , - otherwise.
and
= I
One can verify that the resulting tuple . . sat-
isfies verification equation.
Based on the above signature of knowledge. we ex-
tend it to : = </" =
.. . 
noted
defined as follows.
Definition 4 A
, .
is
discrete to rhr
double discrete to
signature of knowledge is represented by
. . . . . satisfying equation 
I!
- 1, .
The signature of knowledge can only be one
of the known, whcre and
can be computed as follows Without los-
ing generality, we assume that the prover knows where
and = log, (
Firstly, select 1random numbers.
2. Then. select random numbers, . .
3 Select I' Z,
4 For 2. , compute
. - 1)
.
=
for = .
5 .
)
=
6. Compute
- (I)
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7. Let
One verify tha t resulting tuple . .
. . . . satisfies verification equation.
Non-Interactive Publicly Verifiable
Encryption
A scheme involves three entities, namely a
Prover (or Sender. iespectively). a Verifier
and a Receiver There are three algorithm in-
volved. namely a probabilistic algorithm: Verifiable
Encryption a algorithm.
Verification
accepts inputs a parameter a message 
public-key encryptions By
vohing Verifiable Encryption (VE) it
outputs a valid that can only be deciphered by 
one secret keys associated with 1
V a together with all keys
, By invoking the Verification
it outputs {True The output is True
which it be able to be decrypted by one of
secret 1 otherwise i t outputs
the output is discarded (since it is tagged
‘invalid’)
by
invoking the Decryption algorithm
Security Requirements
accepts a obtains the plaintext 
prover to produce an invalid cipher-
text that will pass is negligible
will not have any knowledge about the plaintext 
the test
he .
If both and are honest. at the execution of the
algorithm, the plaintext can al-
ways be obtained. We
C -
4
Having observed several V observe to
a ciphertext is diiectcd to.
4.2. Notions
In terms of security of scheme. we to
two types of attackers. namely and in-
sider attacks call an attack to be an if
the attack is launched by an adversary who either compro-
mises one of the player in the system, namely a receiver 
= 1, a sender or a We will describe the at-
tacks launched these players in more detail later. An out-
sider attack is an attack that is by an “outsider”,
who is not one of the player in the system. we de-
fine these as follows
Let A be an outside attacker, whose running time is
bounded by that polynomial a security
ter We require that 
In following, we define three differen: attacks launched
by insiders W e relate these attacks with the sccurity no-
tions for the in the system
the security for sender defined as follows
require that if message is encrypted and for
user R,, 1 then any other receiver will
not he able to read encrypted message We that
SLY
The main role o f the verifier i s to make sure that the en-
crypted message to one of the receivers in
group Hence, the security for the verifier is de-
fined a5 follows Consider an attacker A who would like to
send an encrypted message to a person, (1
HIS intention is to make the verifier believes that this 
sage is intended to one of the receiver 
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We say attack is the receiver that
the mecsage is directed to one o f the 1
attack explained as follows The attacker
wants to flood" the with so at
stage. the will collapse the messages will
be in the but no receiver retrieve
i t . The probability of this attack is bounded by 
Wc note this security notion is to first
rcquircmcnt mentioned earlier. We also note that this
attack is often referred
the c
this attack, the A tries
to encrypted directed to a receiver
1 Intuitively, 4 would like to reject valid en-
crypted directed to but accept all other
valid encrypted directed to receivers
Wc formally security notion as "IND-PV
SCCA" (SCCA = "Signer Chosen Ciphertext Attack") as
follows
Definition Let A be
is bounded by that is in
A the view of the verifier: We
consider
decrypt the
is
2) .
We define the attacker A's by the probabil-
i s said to be secure if
(k ) is in
ity SCCAA
4.3. The Scheme
this section, we propose non-interactive PV
based on the building blocks in the pre-
vious The scheme is 3 5 follows
Setup-
Let and = + 1 Let be
a cyclic group of order and be an elcinent of
with receiver
a random sets his public key to
a message the pub-
key & (that is one of
does the following
Verifiable Encrypticn
1 Selects a random element y from
2 Computes A = =
3. Sets the ciphertext to be.
A ,
A = A
Verification
To verify a ciphertext, the tests whether 
=
1
is correct then it True. Other-
wise. outputs -
A receiver R,.1 holds the correct secret
key D, with can decrypt the by
computing
=
Then. R, needs to verify whether I' = If i t
holds with equality, then obtains the plaintext
4.4. Security Analysis
Theorem (Security against Outsider Attacks).
exists ci-
phertext key s
Theorem 2 (Security for the Sender).
attacker to
directed to the a secret of
is negligible.
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5. An Extension: The Sender from A Ring
Model
As Section the PVRTF scheme be
used to provide (or prover's) privacy In PVRTE
identity ofthe prover is ambiguous The prover
can message of the
we assume eligible
provers resp denoted = 1
The collection of provers denoted as
receiveis in the group, denoted as R,, = 1. ,
The collection ol'receivers denoted as
Any can send a message on behalf of
This message will then verified
docs know about the identity ofthe prover
that encrypted message was
encrypted message intended
If is with this tact. 
then IS stored until retrieved by
the Finally. R,
the stored encrypted by using his secret key
The Generic Construction for PVRTE Schemes
provide generic for
PVRTE PV schemes and ring
following
A of three main
Verifiable
A of algorithms,
Verifiable
key
generic as follows
,
, , ,
The result of this True or
If returns True preceding step.
We note that similar result can be by employ-
ing a ring the contribution
of this paper is to how to to
PVRTE. then will the detail the ring
scheme in
6. Conclusion
We a new scnerne
Our scheme is based
the non-interactive signature based on proof of knowledge
on equality of discrete logarithms and double discrete
that was proposed in this paper Our scheme
be easily extended to provide that can-
not be obtained using interactive schemes developed in the
work We how to it by combin-
ing ring scheme with
verifiable I -out-of-n scheme
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